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bloodless victory in the Cold War (since its opponent crumbled from the inside). It is unique
also in that it is an institutionalized alliance: In addition to a standing military command
structure, it also has a permanent politico-military headquarters in Brussels with some 1,000
civilian and 500 military personnel, headed by a Secretary-General.
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This is such a prominent feature of NATO that often this bureaucratic apparatus is mistaken
for the actual alliance, that is the treaty bond between the member states. Compare the US
alliance with Australia or Japan, for example. These do not have their own bureaucracy, so
when Washington discusses issues with Canberra or Tokyo, any decisions are afterwards
implemented by the national governments concerned. In NATO, however, whenever an issue
is discussed between allies, there is always the temptation to add another branch to the
NATO headquarters, and have the apparatus begin to produce papers.
Added to this is the cyclical tendency to broaden the NATO agenda. Every so many years, the
fear crops up that the alliance is losing relevance. Why this is so, is not clear, for its relevance
is obvious: NATO guarantees deterrence and defense for all 30 allies. But the answer to this
somewhat irrational fear is always the same, as it is today when the alliance re�ects upon its
future in the NATO 2030 process: Let’s add more topics to NATO’s remit. Thus, NATO
meetings cover energy, climate, migration, technology, resilience, and, most recently and
urged on by the US, China.
Of course, NATO allies must discuss and consult each other on all issues that they deem
relevant for their defense, including those listed above. But that does not always mean that
the NATO apparatus is best placed to implement any conclusions at which the allies arrive. In
most cases, indeed, it is not, for lack of authority, expertise, and instruments outside its core
area of deterrence and defense. NATO can assess the impact of the climate crisis on security
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threats, for example, and green its own way of functioning – but what more is it going to do to
halt the climate crisis? On most of these topics, it is the allies themselves, but also the
European Union, that have the responsibility and the capacity to act on the core of the matter.
Very often the push to widen the agenda comes from the US. Very often as well, the European
allies are less enthusiastic, but end up giving in, doing just the minimum to keep the US happy.
Whether that makes the alliance more effective, is doubtful; it rather dilutes its focus and
cohesion. At NATO’s foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels on March 23-24, however, the
European allies seemed to be more aware of their own speci�c interests and less inclined to
follow the US lead.
Just like the Trump administration, the Biden administration has been pushing to put China on
the NATO agenda. In Brussels, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken declared that China is a
threat to the allies’ collective security and prosperity. The statement that the ministers
adopted duly speaks of “assertive and authoritarian powers” that “challenge the rules-based
international order, including through hybrid and cyber threats, the malicious use of new
technologies, as well as other asymmetric threats” – but it mentions only Russia by name, not
China.
The Biden administration is, in fact, a lot more nuanced in its appraisal of China than its
predecessor. Its 
 states that “strategic competition does not, and
should not, preclude working with China when it is in our national interest to do so.” That is
very close to the EU’s view that China is a partner, a competitor, and a rival all at once.
American and European interests do not entirely overlap, however. For the US, as the leading
great power, the rise of China as such is much more inherently problematic than for the EU.
The recent deterioration of relations following the adoption of mutual sanctions
notwithstanding, few in Europe see China as a direct security threat.
For most Europeans, therefore, China is primarily a foreign policy issue, which they prefer to
deal with through the EU. Rather than distract NATO from its core task of deterring and
defending against Russia, the NATO apparatus should limit itself to monitoring developments
in Chinese defense that have a potential impact on NATO’s defense. It is worth noting that the
central and eastern European allies that are most concerned by Russia’s assertive behavior
are also the most open to China, whereas many western and northern European countries
that also favor a stronger EU role in defense have become more careful of China’s presence on
their markets.
China is indeed also a major geo-economic issue. The main way in which the EU and China
position themselves vis-à-vis each other is by building connectivity with other states and by
instrumentalizing access to their own markets. The EU’s economic power largely determines
its resilience: its capacity to take its own decisions and provide citizens with the public goods
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that they require in the face of all attempts at subversion and coercion by any foreign powers.
Resilience, like China, is another issue on which there is a large gap between the amount of
time that NATO dedicates to it and the actual contribution that its apparatus can bring. The
key actor on the European side, actually, is again the EU: The EU is a single market, so any act
of coercion or subversion by a foreign power against one member state affects the Union as a
whole. To prevent coercion and subversion, most geo-economic competences lie with the EU
or are shared with its member states. It certainly is not up to NATO, or to the US, to decide, for
example, which Chinese (or Russian) investment can or cannot be allowed in the EU.
On the one hand, when responding to subversion or coercion, diplomatic and economic
sanctions are also adopted through the EU – few member states will dare confront another
power alone. On the other hand, not every act of subversion or coercion against the EU has an
effect on or calls for measures from the US and other non-EU allies. The NATO apparatus, in
any case, has little or no instruments in these areas. The allies can coordinate, and the
apparatus can design benchmarks, but only to the extent that these are reconcilable with EU
policy.
In other words, if the US wants to get something done on China, resilience, and other issues
that are not primarily defense-related, the solution is not to channel them through NATO, but
to speak directly with the EU. Which is precisely what Secretary Blinken did after the NATO
ministerial, meeting with EU High Representative Josep Borrell. They agreed to �nally launch
the EU-US dialogue on China that was already discussed, but in the end proved impossible
with the Trump administration. NATO, meanwhile, should stop trying to build its pro�le in
areas where others are much better placed. Instead, it should 
, which it does very well: deterrence and defense.
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